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Abstract 
 
The definition of the irrationality ground of judicial review recognises the 
constitutional principle of the separation of powers, in allowing for judicial control of 
the executive only very rarely. The author in a previous article in this study found that 
the courts, on occasions, had intervened in circumstances where administrative 
decisions arguably were not irrational. To this end, the purpose of this article is to 
assess the constitutionality of these seemingly low standards of irrationality. The 
author does so by reference either to the manner of review employed – the use of the 
proportionality principle, for example – or the context of the administrative decision 
under scrutiny, such as the infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights. The 
author finds that the cases from the previous article where low standards of 
irrationality were arguably adopted were, in fact, legitimate according to these chosen 
methods of evaluation. However, this is an interim conclusion because, for reasons of 
word length, the author is unable to complete a full assessment here. It is therefore 
proposed that a subsequent article will continue to examine the constitutionality of 
these cases. Furthermore, the author will also try and establish a zone of executive 
decision-making, for reasons of democracy, where the courts are excluded from 
irrationality review. If the author is unsuccessful in this regard, the final conclusion of 
this study will inevitably be that low standards of judicial intervention exist without 
limit – a clear assault on the constitutional principle stated above. 
 
                                                     ∗
 The author wishes to thank Michael Salter, Stuart Toddington and Steve Foster for 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. The author is, of course, responsible for any errors 
or omissions. 
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Introduction 
 
Orthodox theories of administrative law prescribe that judicial review is concerned 
with examining only the legality of executive power rather than its merits.1 For 
example, Lord Irvine, a previous Lord Chancellor, has identified at least three 
justifications for this principle. First, ‘a constitutional imperative’: public authorities 
should exercise discretionary powers that have been entrusted to them by Parliament. 
Every authority has within its influence a level of knowledge and experience which 
justifies the decision of Parliament to entrust that authority with decision-making 
power. Second, ‘lack of judicial expertise’: it follows that the courts are ill-equipped 
to take decisions in place of the designated authority. Third, ‘the democratic 
imperative’: it has long been recognised that elected public authorities, and 
particularly local authorities, derive their authority in part from their electoral 
mandate.2 These imperatives of judicial restraint owe much, therefore, to the 
constitutional principle of the separation of powers between the organs of the state.3 
Though this principle has never been strictly enforced in the UK,4 the tenets of such a 
philosophy arguably still hold true.5 Indeed, this principle has been strengthened in 
recent years with the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), 
incorporating certain Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR),6 such as Article 6, the right to a fair trial by an independent and unbiased 
                                                     
1
 See S. De Smith et al (1999, p.20). 
2
 Irvine (1999, pp.60-61). Note: Lord Irvine rejected the review of merits where the courts 
were employing principles of the common law (such as irrationality), but later accepted it 
when they were applying the proportionality test to certain breaches of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – see Irvine (1998, p.229) and (2003, p.313). 
3
 See Montesquieu (1994, Chapter XI, pp.3-6). 
4
 See, for example, Barendt (1995) and Barber (2001). 
5
 See, for example, Hoffman (2002) and Steyn (2002). 
6
 The Human Rights Act 1998 s.1 labels Articles 2 – 12 and 14 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), Articles 1-3 of the 1st Protocol of the ECHR and Protocol 13 of 
the ECHR as ‘Convention rights’.  
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tribunal, into UK Law and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA), section 3 of 
which upholds the independence of the judiciary. 
 
Nevertheless, is this traditional legal theory that the courts’ role is to assess only the 
lawfulness of administrative action still true in practice? In a previous article the 
author sought to answer this very question.7 He analysed several cases where the 
courts had ruled that the administrative body in question had acted contrary to the 
principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness/irrationality,8 but found that the case facts 
did not arguably support judicial intervention. In this regard the standards of 
irrationality adopted caused the judges to review the merits of the decision under 
consideration.9 In concluding that this finding was an anathema to established 
principles of public law, the author questioned whether this orthodox theory about 
judicial review’s supervisory nature was a constitutional “fig leaf”, disguising yet 
another fiction of administrative law?10  
 
If in reality this traditional notion of judicial review is not always being employed by 
the courts in practice, what then are the consequences of this in the modern era? As a 
student of administrative law schooled in the ‘green light’11/ political constitutionalist 
traditions of John Griffith,12 Patrick McAuslan13 and others – that is, a deep suspicion 
                                                     
7
 Turner (2006). 
8
 Referring to the judgment of Lord Greene in the Court of Appeal in Associated Provincial 
Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, Lord Diplock in Council of 
Civil Service Unions and Others v. Minister for the Civil Service (the ‘GCHQ’ case) [1985] AC 
374 said that irrationality could now be succinctly referred to as “Wednesbury 
unreasonableness” (p.410). Thus in this article the terms irrationality and Wednesbury 
unreasonableness are used interchangeably to denote the same ground of review. 
9
 In the ‘GCHQ’ case Lord Diplock described an irrational decision as a decision which was 
(ibid., p.410): “So outrageous in its defiance of logic and accepted moral standards that no 
sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.” 
The author therefore questioned whether the facts in several unreasonableness cases were 
irrational according to the standard implied by this definition. 
10
 The judicial review of administrative powers is often justified on the basis that it is 
enforcing the will of Parliament expressed through an enabling statute – see, for example, 
Oliver (1986). However, other commentators such as Sir John Laws have described this 
enforcement of legislative will argument as a “fig leaf”– see Laws (1995). 
11
 See Harlow and Rawlings (1984, pp.42-47). 
12
 See, for example, Griffith (1979), (1985), (1997) and (2000). Adam Tomkins is perhaps 
Griffith’s new standard bearer – see, for example, Tomkins (2002), (2003), (2004), (2005a) 
and (2005b). For criticisms of political constitutionalism, see, for example, Poole (2005) and 
(2007). A recent partial defence of political constitutionalism is Gee (2008). 
13
 See, for example, McAuslan (1971) and (1983) and McAuslan and McEldowney (1985). 
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about the courts holding the state ever more to account at the expense of political 
scrutiny – the author is naturally inclined to view his earlier finding about the judicial 
review of the merits of administrative action as something sinister. Perhaps a 
usurpation by the unelected judiciary of the power of the executive? Or is it 
something more benign? A matter of evolution, a natural repositioning of the courts 
within the normal jockeying for power that exists amongst the institutions of the 
state? Or is it something more systematic? A legitimate shift in the balance of power 
between the courts and government? The purpose of this article is to address some of 
these questions.  
 
The author therefore intends to reassess here the classic limits of judicial review, 
reflecting the possible constitutional elevation of the courts which he found in the 
previous article. He proposes to do this by examining the possible motives for judicial 
intervention in some of these merits-review cases from the earlier piece with a view to 
questioning whether the low standards of irrationality employed were in fact within 
constitutional norms. To this end, much of this article considers the legitimacy of the 
manner in which the courts conducted merits-review. That is, the author questions 
whether some of the judges in these earlier cases actually employed a different test of 
review to irrationality – proportionality, for example – which may affect the conclusion 
one draws about their constitutionality. The remainder of this article considers the 
legitimacy of some of these merits-review cases by reference to the context of the 
administrative decision under examination; this is with particular reference to the HRA 
which has now made the applicability of irrationality to rights’ cases possibly 
redundant.14 For reasons of space the author is unable to complete an evaluation of the 
HRA’s impact on the constitutionality of employing low standards of irrationality so is 
forced to leave some discussion of this issue for a later article. Suffice it to say, however, 
this does not prevent him from drawing some important, preliminary conclusions here 
that the cases of merits-review identified in the previous piece were arguably legitimate. 
 
The Judicial Review of Merits 
 
                                                     
14
 See Hilson (2003, p.142). 
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In the first article, it was stated above, the author examined several cases where the 
courts ruled that the administrative decision-makers in question had acted contrary to 
the principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness/irrationality, questioning whether the 
case facts justified the judges in holding the decisions to be unlawful.15  If not, this 
had caused the courts to review the merits of the executive activity under 
consideration. For the purposes of this article it will be necessary to revisit the low 
standards of irrationality employed by the courts in two of these cases: Regina v. 
Coventry City Council, Ex parte Phoenix Aviation16and Regina v. Cambridge District 
Health Authority, Ex parte B17 in the Divisional Court. 
 
In Ex parte Phoenix Aviation Simon Brown LJ (as he then was) held that Coventry City 
Council had acted unlawfully in restricting the flights of live animals from Coventry 
Airport, after breaches of airport security by public demonstrators opposed to the 
exports. The judge said: “The council’s resolution was wholly disproportionate to the 
security risk presented at the time.”18 
 
Here, Mr Brewer, the Assistant Chief Constable of Warwickshire Police, was worried 
about the penetration of the airport’s perimeter fence by demonstrators so wrote to the 
airport manager, expressing his concerns should the flights resume. He urged the 
manager to undertake a comprehensive review of security (since the police did not 
have a responsibility to protect the airport from trespass). In following the police’s 
advice, the airport authorities and the council explored the option of improving the 
strength of the airport’s perimeter fence. Because of the likely time to complete the 
work (2-3 months), and its estimated cost (£400,000), the next best course of action to 
prevent the incursion by the demonstrators, it seems to the author, was to cease the 
live animal exports. Is it right, therefore, to categorise this eventual decision by the 
airport authorities and the council as irrational in a public law sense? Was this not a 
                                                     
15
 Turner (2006). 
16
 [1995] 3 All ER 37. 
17
 [1995] 1 FLR 1055. The author also analysed the rulings of the House of Lords in Wheeler 
and Others v. Leicester City Council [1985] AC 1054, the Court of Appeal in West Glamorgan 
County Council v. Rafferty and Others [1987] 1 WLR 457, the Court of Appeal in Regina v. 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Ex parte Lonrho PLC The Times, 18 January 1989 and 
the Court of Appeal in Regina v. Cornwall County Council, Ex parte Cornwall and Isles of 
Scilly Guardians Ad Litem and Reporting Panel [1992] 1 WLR 427. 
18
 [1995] 3 All ER 37, p.63. 
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reasonable option addressing the unease which the police had expressed? If so, it is 
contended that this was an engagement by Simon Brown LJ in the merits of the 
council’s decision as the judge adopted a low standard of irrationality. 
 
In Ex parte B the decision of the Cambridge District Health Authority not to fund further 
medical treatment for a girl, B, aged ten with cancer was under scrutiny, Laws J (as he 
then was) ruling this was irrational. Again, was this an administrative decision that was 
unlawful in a public law sense? The author argues that it was not. First, the cancer 
treatment the applicant required had a success rate of only between 10 and 20%, it was at 
variance with the majority of medical opinion and was experimental rather than standard 
therapy. Secondly, arguably, the judge attached too little weight to the opinions of the 
doctors who had treated the girl for much of her life: they did not believe in subjecting 
her to further suffering and trauma when the prospects of success were so slight, and 
carried a high risk of early morbidity. Thirdly, B had already undergone a course of total 
body irradiation which, according to accepted medical opinion, was therapy which no 
one should undergo more than once. Finally, substantial expenditure on treatment with 
such a small prospect of success was not an effective use of financial resources. With a 
limited budget, the authority, it is fair to say, had a responsibility to ensure that sufficient 
funds were available for the care of other patients.19 
 
Ex parte Phoenix Aviation and Ex parte B are just two examples taken from a larger 
sample of merits-review cases identified by the author in the first article of this study. 
But were these low standards of intervention in fact illegitimate? The purpose of this 
article is to address this question.  
 
The Manner of Merits-Review 
 
In examining the constitutionality of the low standards of irrationality identified in the 
previous article, the author here considers the legitimacy of the manner in which the 
courts maybe conducted merits-review. That is, did the judges in these earlier cases 
actually adopt a different test of review to irrationality? If so, what effect does this have 
                                                     
19
 The ruling of Laws J was reversed by the Court of Appeal: Regina v. Cambridge 
District Health Authority, Ex parte B [1995] 1 WLR 898. 
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on the legitimacy of the low standards employed, if at all? The possible application of 
the proportionality test instead of the irrationality test is assessed first. 
 
i) The application of proportionality 
 
It will be recalled that Simon Brown LJ in Ex parte Phoenix Aviation said: “The 
council’s resolution was wholly disproportionate to the security risk presented at the 
time.”20 These words suggest that the judge may have reviewed the merits of the 
Coventry City Council’s decision because he was employing a different test of review 
to irrationality, the proportionality principle.21 
 
Because of the potential for a review of merits by the courts, Lord Lowry in the House of 
Lords in Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Brind22 
delivered a strong rejection of the proportionality test. This was based primarily on the 
constitutional principle of the separation of powers.23 The other judges, Lords Bridge, 
Ackner, Templeman and Roskill, were less dismissive, though they were certainly 
hesitant about recognising the principle as a stand alone head of judicial review. For 
example, Lord Roskill said: 
 
“[The adoption of proportionality] in the present case would be for the court to 
substitute its own judgment of what was needed to achieve a particular objective 
for the judgment of the Secretary of State upon whom that duty has been laid by 
Parliament. But so to hold in the present case is not to exclude the possible future 
development of the law in this respect.”24 
 
                                                     
20
 [1995] 3 All ER 37, p.63. 
21
 See Fordham (1997, p.505). 
22
 [1991] 1 AC 696. 
23
 Ibid., pp.766-767. The judge justified his opinion for several reasons: first, most executive 
decision-makers were elected, for judges to make administrative decisions in place of them 
would be an abuse of their supervisory jurisdiction; secondly, judges were generally ill-
equipped by training or experience to decide an answer where the scales were evenly 
balanced; and, thirdly, the likely increase in applications for judicial review if the standard of 
review were lowered. 
24
 Ibid., p.750. Although the House of Lords was loath to recognise the proportionality test as 
an independent ground of judicial review, this did not have the effect of limiting its application. 
The court accepted that it could be of relevance in establishing irrationality – see later 
discussions of the proportionality test in the main text of this article.  
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English lawyers have experience of the proportionality test through acquaintance with 
the jurisprudence of the European Union25 and constitutional appeals to the Privy 
Council.26 The principle is also applied by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) where a “qualified right” of the ECHR is under consideration.27 Assuming a 
state has lawful authority for its actions, it can infringe basic rights for a legitimate 
aim, like national security or the prevention of disorder or crime, where such an 
infringement is necessary in a democratic society. 
 
A popular explanation of proportionality review was given by Lord Clyde in the Privy 
Council in de Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, 
Lands and Housing.28 In determining whether a limitation was arbitrary or excessive 
the judge said a reviewing court should ask itself: 
 
“[W]hether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify 
limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative 
objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the 
right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.”29 
 
The proportionality principle therefore possesses a “principled template of relevant 
questions”.30 That is, once a reviewing court has been convinced by the legitimacy of the 
aim identified by the state, such as national security or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others, and there was a reasonable nexus between the means to achieve the 
aim – the infringement of the right – and the aim itself, it must then consider whether 
there was a pressing social need for infringing the right. In asking itself the latter 
question the reviewing court is determining whether the means are proportionate to 
the aim being pursued.31  
                                                     
25
 Article 5(3) of the EC Treaty states: “Any action by the Community shall not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.”  
26
 See, for example, Thomas v. Baptiste [2000] 2 AC 1. 
27
 Qualified rights are generally recognised as Articles 8-11 of the ECHR but can be applied 
to other Articles – see footnote 83. 
28
 [1999] 1 AC 69. 
29
 Ibid., p.80.  
30
 See Fordham (2002, p.110). 
31
 In R (Abdi and Nadarajah) v. Secreatary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA 
Civ 1363 Laws LJ extended the scope of the proportionality test to cases concerning 
legitimate expectations – the area of administrative law which obliges executive decision-
 9 
 
Some implications for reviewing courts when employing the proportionality test were 
identified by Lord Steyn in Regina (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department 32 (when contrasting the difference in this principle’s application with the 
Wednesbury irrationality test). The judge said, first, proportionality may require the 
reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision maker has struck, not merely 
whether it was within the range of rational or reasonable decisions.  Secondly, it may 
go further than the irrationality test inasmuch as it may require attention to be directed 
to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations.33 
 
Proportionality therefore requires the courts to compare the weight attached to the right 
which has been infringed – the private right of the applicant – with the weight attached 
to the competing justification for infringing that right – the public interest. Judges could 
not conceivably employ such a process of review without being involved in some 
adjudication of the merits of the infringement.34 The proportionality test is clearly a 
searching method of review and projects courts more into the role of the primary 
decision-maker than the irrationality test, which simply requires the decision maker to 
remain within an area of reasonable responses.35 However, this has not prevented several 
academic commentators, such as Craig,36 Jowell,37 Lester,38 Wong,39 Elliott,40 
                                                                                                                                                        
makers to honour assurances or past practices. In so doing, he made no distinction between 
proportionality’s applicability to substantive as well as procedural legitimate expectations. 
Although welcoming this articulation of the legitimate expectation principles, Elliott 
questions whether proportionality is the appropriate tool for doing so in all legitimate 
expectation cases – see, Elliott (2006a) and (2006b). For a critical response to Elliott, see, for 
example, Knight (2007). 
32
 [2001] 2 AC 532. 
33
 Ibid., p.547. 
34
 An argument that applying the proportionality test means that the courts always conduct 
review upon the merits is strictly incorrect: judges also adopt high standards when employing 
this principle – see later discussions in main text. 
35
 For a useful explanation of how proportionality can differ from irrationality in practice see, 
for example, Taggert (2004). This revisits the original Wednesbury case in the light of the 
enactment of the HRA and the adoption of the proportionality test to infringements of Article 
8, the right to respect for one’s private and family life, home and correspondence, and Article 
10, the right to freedom of expression, of the ECHR. These would be the convention rights at 
issue if the same case facts – prohibiting children under the age of 15 from attending cinemas 
on a Sunday with or without an adult – were to arise again in the post HRA era. 
36
 Craig (1997), (1998) and (1999). 
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Fordham41 and Hickman,42 from arguing (or implying) that the proportionality test 
should not be confined to EU and ECHR Law. For example, Fordham seems 
unrestrained in this regard: “There [is]…an irresistible case for recognising 
proportionality as a self-standing domestic law principle of administrative law, both in 
fundamental rights cases and more generally.”43 In the face of strong academic support, 
therefore, the reviews of merits identified in the previous article of this study such as Ex 
parte Phoenix Aviation and Ex parte B may have been legitimate where the label of the 
irrationality test disguised the adoption of the proportionality test. 
 
Fordham et al are not the only proponents of proportionality. There have been those 
acting in a judicial capacity who have (at the very least) implicitly endorsed the use of 
the test more widely in domestic judicial review. In the House of Lords in Brind a 
majority of the judges, as stated above, hesitated, if not rejected, the wider application of 
proportionality. Indeed, de Burca has argued that Lord Templeman employed the 
proportionality test there in arriving at his ruling.44 
 
More recently, in Regina (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v. Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions45 the House of Lords were again invited to 
consider the more general employment of proportionality in domestic law. In the case 
of Lord Slynn, for example, he plainly envisaged proportionality becoming an 
independent head of judicial review:46 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
37
 Jowell (1996) and (2000) and Jowell and Lester (1987) and (1988). 
38
 Ibid (1987) and (1988) and Lester (2001a). Lord Lester gives a useful explanation of the 
adoption of the proportionality test in other jurisdictions in Lester (2001b).  
39
 Wong (2000).  
40
 Elliott (2001). 
41
 Fordham (2002). 
42
 Hickman (2007). 
43
 Fordham (2002, p.110). 
44
 De Burca (1997, p.574). 
45
 [2003] 2 AC 295. 
46
 On this point Lord Slynn was, arguably, in a minority. Lord Nolan, for example, indicated 
there was no need to extend the grounds of review which he regarded as broad and generous 
(ibid., para 62). Lord Clyde said that it might well be difficult to achieve a sufficient 
enlargement to meet the stated purpose without jeopardising the constitutional balance 
between the role of the courts and the role of the executive (ibid., para 169). The issue was 
not mentioned by either Lord Hoffman or Lord Hutton. 
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“I consider…the time has now come to recognize that this principle is part of 
the English administrative law, not only when judges are dealing with 
Community acts but also when they are dealing with acts subject to domestic 
law. Trying to keep the Wednesbury [irrationality] principle and 
proportionality in separate compartments seems to me to be unnecessary and 
confusing.”47 
 
The House of Lords seemingly embraced the wider adoption of proportionality in 
Regina (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.48 Here the court was 
examining the legality of the blanket policy of the Secretary of State in requiring a 
prisoner’s absence during cell searches whenever privileged legal correspondence 
held by him/her was examined but not read. The court ruled that this practice was 
unlawful since, inter alia, such an action might affect a prisoner’s willingness to 
communicate freely with his/her legal adviser. Lord Bingham said, in words 
reminiscent of the proportionality test in ECHR cases: “The infringement of 
prisoners’ rights to maintain the confidentiality of their privileged legal 
correspondence is greater than is shown to be necessary to serve the legitimate public 
objectives already identified.”49  
 
Furthermore, in implicitly supporting a greater acceptance of the proportionality test, 
Lord Cooke in Daly appeared to do so at the expense of the irrationality test: 
 
“[I] think that the day will come when it will be more widely recognised that 
[Wednesbury irrationality] was an unfortunately retrogressive decision in 
English administrative law…It may well be, however, that the law can never 
be satisfied in any administrative field merely by a finding that the decision 
under review is not capricious or absurd.”50 
 
Following judicial statements of members of the House of Lords in Alconbury and 
Daly Craig argues that the House of Lords had given strong, but not conclusive, 
                                                     
47
 Ibid., para 51. 
48
 [2001] 2 AC 532. 
49
 Ibid., p.544. 
50
 Ibid., p.549. 
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support to the emergence of proportionality as a separate ground of judicial review.51 
One of the more recent authoritative judicial discussions of this issue was the ruling of 
the Court of Appeal in Regina (British Civilian Internees Far East Region) v. 
Secretary of State for Defence,52 where Dyson LJ contributed further to the courts’ 
acceptance of the proportionality principle. Here the applicants wished to challenge 
the compensation scheme for British citizens interned in Japan during World War II. 
The judge said there was a strong case for recognising proportionality as part of 
English domestic law which did not involve Community law or human rights.53  
 
This section has begun to assess the constitutionality of some of the merits-review 
cases the author identified in the previous article of this study. In particular, although 
the cases were examples where the courts seemingly employed the irrationality test, 
they were arguably ones in which a form or variation of proportionality review was 
exercised. Many academic and judicial commentators support the more general 
adoption of the proportionality test in conventional judicial review. Whether the 
principle ought to replace the irrationality test or be an addition to it is largely 
irrelevant to the purpose of this article. What is relevant, however, is establishing the 
legitimacy of these merits-review cases found previously. The author here has 
identified the ruling of Simon Brown LJ in Ex parte Phoenix Aviation as an example 
where proportionality was maybe employed in all but name. This section therefore 
concludes that this review of merits was arguably constitutionally justified because of 
the nature of review exercised. The next section of this article continues the theme of 
this one: it considers the legitimacy of these merits-review cases where the manner in 
employing low standards of irrationality was the possible adoption of another method 
of judicial review, the “hard look” test.  
                                                     
51
 See Craig (2001, p.592). Elliott is more enthusiastic (2002, p.98): “[As regards Daly] Lord 
Diplock’s prediction in GCHQ that proportionality may one day be recognised as an 
independent principle of domestic judicial review has come to pass.” 
52
 [2003] QB 1397. 
53
 Ibid., p.1413. However, Dyson LJ did say it was not for the Court of Appeal to perform the 
Wednesbury irrationality “burial rites”. The continuing existence of the Wednesbury test had 
been acknowledged by the House of Lords on more than one occasion (pp.1413-1414). The 
appeal in British Civilian Internees Far East Region was rejected by the House of Lords so 
arguably the higher court did not feel the need to ‘terminate’ irrationality altogether. Because 
of this, Fordham notes (Fordham 2007, p.267): “The Law Lords, failing to take the hint, put 
the development of the common law back a decade.” He does predict that common law 
proportionality will eventually become a free standing head of challenge, notwithstanding the 
House of Lords rejecting the appeal – see Fordham (2008, p.67). 
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ii) The application of “hard look” 
 
It was submitted above, and in the first article of this study, that the Divisional Court in 
Ex parte B may have adopted a low standard of unreasonableness. This is possible if 
Laws J was employing, as James and Longley have argued,54 a different approach to 
traditional judicial review – one based upon the “hard look” review of administrative 
activity in the United States. 
 
In reference to the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 55 
Craig gives an explanation of the “hard look” test of challenge. He says: 
 
“[The Court said] it could intervene if any of the following defects were present: 
if the agency relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider; 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem; offered an explanation 
which ran counter to the evidence before the agency; was so implausible that it 
could not be sustained; or failed to provide a record which substantiated its 
findings…The “hard look” doctrine therefore represents a shift from a previously 
more minimal standard of review [in the US], where judicial intervention would 
occur only if there was irrationality…”56 
 
In essence, the objective with this test is to ensure that policy alternatives are adequately 
considered, that reasons are proffered for agency decisions, and that differing interests 
can present their views to the agency and have those views adequately discussed.57 
“Hard look” therefore engages a court more in reviewing the manner in which an 
administrative decision was reached. For example, it not only decides matters that are 
relevant to the exercise of a discretion, but also the weight to be attached to them. This is 
clearly not the same as the UK courts’ application of the Wednesbury principle: 
irrationality review is concerned only with the outcome of an administrative decision and 
                                                     
54
 James and Longley (1995, p.371). 
55
 463 US 29 (1983). 
56
 Craig (1994, p.438). 
57
 Ibid., p.439. 
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whether it was outrageous in its defiance of logic. Indeed, the judicial consideration of 
the weight to be attached to relevant matters was excluded from irrationality by the 
House of Lords in Tesco Stores v. Secretary of State for the Environment.58 
 
Despite “hard look” obviously being a more intensive form of review than irrationality, 
this has not prevented Sir Stephen Sedley (extra-judicially),59 Harden and Lewis60 and 
James and Longley61 from arguing (or implying) that it is legitimate for the courts to 
apply it when exercising their powers of judicial review. For example, Harden and Lewis 
state: “The soft standard of judicial review associated in Britain with the Wednesbury 
test is inadequate...The hard look doctrine is justified as the most acceptable guarantee 
that all values are genuinely considered during the policy-making process.”62  
 
Hence, Laws J’s employment of low standard of irrationality in Ex Parte B was maybe 
legitimate, if, in fact, the judge was applying the “hard look” test. The next section 
continues the theme of this article in assessing the legitimacy of the reviews of merits 
identified previously, albeit analysing the effect the context of the administrative 
decision at issue – a breach of the applicant’s fundamental rights, for example – had on 
the low standard of irrationality arguably adopted. 
 
The Context of the Administrative Decision 
 
i) Infringements of fundamental rights 
 
In addition to the manners in which Laws J and Simon Brown LJ may have engaged in a 
review of merits, the context of the administrative decisions under consideration is 
potentially another important issue in the debate about their constitutionality. For 
example, in Ex parte B the fact that fundamental rights were engaged possibly affected 
the standard of judicial intervention. Laws J said: “The law requires that where a public 
                                                     
58
 [1995] 1 WLR 759. Of course, if “hard look” constitutes an assessment of the weight to be 
attached to relevant matters, then this is similar to the methodology of proportionality review 
identified in the speech of Lord Steyn in Regina (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2001] 2 AC 532 (para 28). 
59
 Sedley (1997, p.9). 
60
 Harden and Lewis (1986, p.205). 
61
 James and Longley (1995, pp.372-373). 
62
 Harden and Lewis (1986, pp.272-275). 
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body enjoys a discretion whose exercise may infringe [a basic liberty], it is not to be 
permitted to perpetrate any such infringement unless it can show a substantial objective 
justification on public interest grounds.”63 This test of irrationality employed by Laws J, 
in requiring the state to identify a legitimate aim for its decision to cease cancer therapy 
for a terminally ill child, and to give very good reasons for doing so, arguably explains 
the low standard he adopted. 
 
Simon Brown LJ may also have conducted a review upon the merits in Ex parte Phoenix 
Aviation because of the context of the administrative decision. The judge said: 
 
 “Tempting though it may sometimes be for public authorities to yield too readily 
to threats of disruption, they must expect the courts to review any such decision 
with particular rigour – this is not an area where they can be permitted a wide 
measure of discretion. As when fundamental human rights are in play, the courts 
will adopt a more interventionist role.”64 
 
Simon Brown LJ therefore believed that engaging in a review of merits was justified 
where the court’s purpose was to uphold the rule of law and prevent lawful trade from 
being disrupted because of public protest. Nevertheless, how widespread is this view that 
adopting a low standard of irrationality is legitimate if administrative action, for 
example, has breached fundamental rights? For example, Allan argues: 
 
 “The virtue of judicial restraint must depend on the nature of the [infringement] 
alleged. The distinction between appeal and review must be an elastic one, 
permitting more intensive scrutiny of executive action which threatens basic 
liberties than might be appropriate in other cases.”65 
 
Where fundamental rights have been engaged, the courts have developed an “anxious 
scrutiny” approach to irrationality.66 For example, in the House of Lords in Brind the 
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 [1995] 1 FLR 1055, p.1060. 
64
 [1995] 3 All ER 37, p.62. 
65
 Allan (1993, p.188). Allan does advocate a wider review of merits by the courts – see Allan 
(1998).  
66
 This was developed first by the House of Lords in R v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] AC 514. There Lord Bridge said (p.531): “When an 
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court held that the Secretary of State had not acted unreasonably in preventing the direct 
speech of suspected terrorists (voice-overs by actors were used). However, the Minster’s 
infringement of the right to freedom of expression clearly affected the test of irrationality 
the court employed. Lord Bridge said: 
 
 “In deciding whether the Secretary of State...could reasonably impose the 
restriction he has imposed on the broadcasting organisations, we are...perfectly 
entitled to start from the premise that any restriction of the right to freedom of 
expression requires to be justified and that nothing less than an important 
competing public interest would be sufficient to justify it.”67 
 
By requiring the Secretary of State to justify his decision on the basis of an important 
competing public interest, Lord Bridge was obliging the Minister to show not only that 
the infringement had lawful grounds, but that it needed to be balanced against a 
legitimate objective of the state.  Is this not proportionality, or at least a variation of it? If 
so, the judge was seemingly lowering the standard of the irrationality test in rights’ cases 
by waiving the less onerous obligation of the applicants to prove that the infringement 
was not within a range of options open to a reasonable decision maker.68 
 
If Lord Bridge was not formally adopting proportionality in rights’ cases, then there is 
every reason to believe Lord Templeman did so since his speech was couched in a 
language suggestive of this test:  “[T]he interference with freedom of expression must be 
necessary and proportionate to the damage which the restriction is designed to 
prevent.”69  
 
Because of inconsistent judgments by the House of Lords70 the standard of irrationality 
adopted in this case was arguably unclear. In this regard the ruling of the Court of 
                                                                                                                                                        
administrative decision…is said to be one which may put the applicant’s life at risk, the basis 
of the decision must surely call for the most anxious scrutiny.” 
67
 [1991] 1 AC 696, pp.748-749. 
68
 Hunt agrees – see Hunt (1997, p.183). 
69
 [1991] 1 AC 696, p.751. De Burca agrees that Lord Templeman adopted the proportionality 
test – see de Burca (1997, p.574). 
70
 Lord Roskill concurred with the speech of Lord Bridge, Lord Lowry concurred with the 
speech of Lord Ackner and Lords Bridge, Ackner and Templeman did not concur with any of 
their fellow judges. 
 17 
Appeal in Regina v. Ministry of Defence, Ex parte Smith71 is a useful guide to 
determining the legitimacy of merits-review cases where fundamental rights have been 
infringed. In Smith Sir Thomas Bingham MR (as he then was) accepted the submission 
of counsel for one of the appellants, Mr. Pannick QC, regarding the appropriate standard 
to be employed by the courts in this context: 
  
 “The court may not interfere with the exercise of an administrative discretion on 
substantive grounds save where the court is satisfied that the decision is 
unreasonable in the sense that it is beyond the range of responses open to a 
reasonable decision-maker. But in judging whether the decision-maker has 
exceeded this margin of appreciation the human rights context is important. The 
more substantial the interference with human rights, the more the court will 
require by way of justification before it is satisfied that the decision is 
reasonable.”72 
 
This dictum is possibly a distillation of the principles outlined above in the speech of 
Lord Bridge in Brind. However, since the judge here said not only must there be a 
justification for infringing a fundamental right, but the more serious the infringement, 
the more convincing must be the justification, some commentators have argued that this 
approach is more akin to a proportionality type of test than Brind.73 For example, Elliott 
argues: 
 
“This form of review…presents a much less opaque methodology than that 
which is usually associated with Wednesbury [irrationality]…Indeed the 
structure of the English courts’ inquiry in Smith – given the recognition of a 
valued norm and of the need for its infraction to be justified by reference to a 
competing legitimate aim – bears substantial resemblance to the methodology 
of proportionality review.”74 
 
                                                     
71
 [1996] QB 517. 
72
 Ibid., p.554. 
73
 Some writers hold an opposite view – see, for example, Hickman (2004, p.186). If the 
Court of Appeal in Smith did in fact apply proportionality, it was a higher standard than that 
adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in its ‘appeal’. See Smith and Grady v. 
United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493 (p.543). 
74
 Elliott (2002, p.106). 
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Some five years after Smith, in Regina v. Lord Saville of Newdigate, Ex parte A,75 Lord 
Woolf MR (as he then was) again stressed the applicability of basic liberties to the 
irrationality test. In ruling that the decision of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry chaired by 
Lord Saville not to grant anonymity to British soldiers giving evidence was 
unreasonable, the judge said: 
 
“What is important to note is that when a fundamental right such as the right to 
life is engaged, the options available to the reasonable decision-maker are 
curtailed. They are curtailed because it is unreasonable to reach a decision which 
contravenes or could contravene human rights unless there are sufficiently 
significant countervailing considerations. In other words, it is not open to the 
decision-maker to risk interfering with fundamental rights in the absence of 
compelling justification. Even the broadest discretion is constrained by the need 
for there to be countervailing circumstances justifying interference with human 
rights. The courts will anxiously scrutinize the strength of the countervailing 
circumstances and the degree of interference with the human rights involved and 
then apply the test accepted…in Smith.”76  
 
The standard of judicial intervention adopted by the Court of Appeal here was clearly 
low, reflecting the threats to the safety of the service personnel that publication of their 
identities would pose – but at what level? Hilson has argued that the test employed in 
Saville is, in fact, a more intensive method of review than that employed by the Court of 
Appeal in Smith:77 
 
“In Saville, the court not only adjusted the Smith test…but also lowered the 
threshold of its application…The question is whether, if the Wednesbury 
principle is reinterpreted and applied in such a radical way, it remains the same 
principle or whether it has become proportionality in all but name.”78 
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 [2000] 1 WLR 1855. 
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 Ibid., p.1866. 
77
 Hilson (2003). 
78
 Ibid., p.134. 
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Several judicial approaches to the irrationality test in rights’ cases have been advanced. 
Despite difficulties in identifying precisely the standard employed in these cases, the 
judges clearly examined the administrative decisions at issue with some degree of 
intensity. To this end, a low threshold of intervention in the merits-review cases 
discussed earlier – Ex Parte B and Ex Parte Phoenix Aviation – was academically and 
judicially legitimate. Nevertheless, how is this interim conclusion about the justifiability 
of merits-review in rights’ cases affected by the enactment of the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA) in October 2000? This is the purpose of the next section. 
  
ii) Breaches of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
  
Determining the degree of irrationality review where there have been infringements of 
basic liberties, and their legitimacy, may be academic since the coming into force in 
October 2000 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA),79 allowing individuals to enforce 
Convention rights in domestic courts.80 The HRA incorporated some of the Articles of 
the ECHR81 into domestic law principally through s.3:  “So far as it is possible to do 
so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a 
way which is compatible with the Convention rights.” In interpreting primary and 
secondary legislation, the courts, according to s.2, must take into account the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). If a court cannot interpret a statute 
“so far as it is possible to do so”, s.4(2) provides: “If the court is satisfied that the 
provision is incompatible with a Convention right, it may make a declaration of 
incompatibility.” A declaration of incompatibility is not an order invalidating an Act 
of Parliament on the basis that it infringes a Convention right. Amending offending 
primary legislation to make it Convention compatible is the preserve of the executive 
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 Procedurally, there are different rules for conventional judicial review and judicial review 
under the HRA. This means that, notwithstanding the coming into force of the HRA, 
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through a fast track procedure under s.10.82 However the judicial review of secondary 
legislation is not excluded. Section 6(1) states: “It is unlawful for a public authority to 
act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.”  
 
 The intensity of review and qualified Convention rights  
 
In determining breaches of the ECHR the ECtHR applies the proportionality test to 
“qualified rights”. These include Articles 8-11 which require a balancing of competing 
private interests – privacy, freedom of conscience, thought and religion, freedom of 
expression and freedom of association and assembly – and public ones – national 
security, public safety and the economic well being of the country, for example. The test 
has a role to play in considering breaches of other Articles of the ECHR83 but is 
excluded from reviews of Articles 3,84 4(1), 6, 7(1) and 12, which have no limitations, 
and Articles 285 and 5 where the limitations are specific. 
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The case of Daly was referred to earlier in this article because of the House of Lords’ 
general support for proportionality in domestic law. It is examined again here because 
the judges also required its application to breaches of qualified rights under the HRA. In 
Daly the court, it will be recalled, held that the blanket policy of the Secretary of State – 
obliging prisoners to be absent during cell searches whenever their privileged legal 
correspondence was examined but not read – was unlawful. The court found, inter 
alia, that the policy amounted to a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s 
right to respect for his correspondence under Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Lord 
Bingham said: “The infringement of prisoners’ rights to maintain the confidentiality 
of their privileged legal correspondence is greater than is shown to be necessary to 
serve the legitimate public objectives already identified.”86  
 
The House of Lords has since applied the proportionality test to other qualified rights 
of the ECHR such as Articles 10(1) and 11(1) of the ECHR, the freedom of 
expression and the freedom of assembly and association respectively: Regina 
(Laporte) v. Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary.87 Here the police had 
stopped three coaches five kilometres away from an anti-Iraq war demonstration at 
RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire. The police believed that some passengers were 
likely to commit breaches of the peace so prevented all three of the coaches from 
continuing on to the demonstration. The police then escorted the coaches back to their 
place of origin, London. Lord Bingham said: 
 
“There was no reason (other than [the applicant’s] refusal to give her name, 
which however irritating to the police was entirely lawful) to view the 
claimant as other than a committed, peaceful demonstrator. It was wholly 
disproportionate to restrict her exercise of her rights under Article 10 and 11 
because she was in the company of others some of whom might, at some time 
in the future, breach the peace.”88 
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The UK courts now employ the proportionality principle since the coming into force 
of the HRA. Clearly, therefore, a review of merits is justified where infringements of 
qualified rights of the ECHR are alleged. In this regard, some of the reviews of merits 
identified in the first article in this study, but which have not yet been referred to fully in 
this article, such as Wheeler v. Leicester City Council89 and West Glamorgan County 
Council v. Rafferty,90 are arguably now legitimate in the light of the enactment of the 
HRA, if they were not so before October 2000. In Wheeler the council had proposed 
removing the use of a recreation ground from Leicester Rugby Club, for not having 
prevented some of its players from joining a rebel rugby tour to South Africa. In 
bringing pressure to bear on the club, with the ultimate threat of sanctions, was this not 
possibly a breach of the rebel rugby players’ ECHR rights under Article 9(1), the 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, Article 10(1), the freedom of expression, 
and Article 11(1), the freedom of assembly and association? By attempting to prevent 
the players going to South Africa the council, it is submitted, were denying them a voice 
in opposing the world-wide ban on sporting links with that country. Perhaps the players 
had preferred the right to effect change to the then apartheid regime through active sports 
participation in the country?91 Assuming the players’ fundamental rights under the 
ECHR had been engaged, proportionality would have obliged the council to justify a 
legitimate objective for the infringements and a proportionate balance to be undertaken 
between the public and private rights at issue. 
 
A similar qualified right to that maybe engaged in Wheeler, Article 11(1), and other 
qualified rights of the ECHR, Article 8(1), the right to respect for private and family 
life, home and correspondence, and Article 1 of the 1st Protocol, the protection of 
property, may have been infringed in Rafferty. Here West Glamorgan County 
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 Indeed, Jowell and Lester (1988) suggest that Wheeler was a case where the proportionality 
test was maybe employed. They say (p.61): “Lord Templeman considered [the council’s 
decision] to be a misuse of power, “punishing the club where it had done no wrong”. Lord 
Roskill considered the withdrawal of a licence to be an unfair means of pursuing the council’s 
ends. Both speeches reflect the notion of proportionality, Lord Templeman concentrating on 
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Council had acted irrationally in seeking an order for possession of land occupied by 
“gypsies”, who were causing a public nuisance, without providing them with 
alternative accommodation. Was this not, therefore, a prima facie denial by the 
council of the travellers’ rights to respect for their home life, freedom of association 
and peaceful enjoyment of their possessions? If so, the court would have been 
obliged to balance these rights with the public interest of protecting disorder and 
crime, applying the proportionality test. 
 
However, the adoption of the proportionality principle does not necessarily mean a 
reviewing court is engaging in a review of merits. For example, Maurice Kay LJ in 
the Court of Appeal in Regina (Clays Lane Housing Co-operative) v. Housing 
Corporation92 reminded the courts that there is still a degree of latitude accorded to 
the executive when employing this test of review. He said that although 
proportionality required a balancing exercise, and a decision which was justified on 
the basis of a compelling case in the public interest, it did not require a decision that 
was the least intrusive of Convention rights. The “least intrusive” approach is a more 
intensive method of review than proportionality and adopted by courts in the US, for 
example.93 In this respect, some UK judges may not regard the proportionality test as 
obliging them to exercise the degree of enquiry that the author implied was maybe 
the case when he first discussed this principle in an earlier section of this article. 
What effect, therefore, does this possible inference about proportionality have on the 
conclusions drawn from the previous article in this study about irrationality review 
affording the courts the opportunity to review merits? 
 
Furthermore, in the international sphere the ECtHR has adopted a “margin of 
appreciation” reflecting the social and cultural differences which exist amongst the 
member states of the Council of Europe, the signatories of the ECHR. This margin of 
appreciation is not necessarily evident in the various Articles of the ECHR under 
consideration but the context in which the Articles arise. To this end, the ECtHR can 
adopt high standards of proportionality, as was maybe the case in Handyside v. 
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Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union 542 US 214 (2004). 
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United Kingdom.94 Here the decision to prosecute the distributor of the Little Red 
Schoolbook under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 for the purpose of protecting 
public morals was lawful. Yes, the ECtHR applied the proportionality test – a suitable 
balance had been struck between the private right of the applicant to freedom of 
expression and the public interest of the state to protect the morals of children and 
young people – but it is submitted that it did not do so to any great degree. The court 
said: 
 
“[It] is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting 
States a uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by their 
respective laws of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and 
from place to place, especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and 
far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject. By reason of their direct and 
continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are 
in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion 
on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the “necessity” of a 
“restriction” or “penalty” intended to meet them…Consequently, Article 10(2) 
leaves to the Contracting States a margin of appreciation.”95 
 
Despite the margin of appreciation principle being applicable in a supra-national 
context there may be a similar principle – either “a discretionary area of judgment”, 
“a margin of discretion” or “judicial deference” – adopted by the UK courts when 
considering infringements of the ECHR in domestic law.96 In this regard, it is unlikely 
that the UK courts will examine breaches of qualified rights of the ECHR with any 
great intensity where a balance is to be struck between private and public 
considerations such as public morality, and, for example, the prevention of disorder 
and crime and national security.97 If so, the degree of review in these contexts 
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possibly results in an occasional overlap between the proportionality test and the 
Wednesbury irrationality one; that is, cases would be decided in the same way 
whichever approach is adopted. For example in the House of Lords in Brind, although 
the court was loath to recognise the proportionality test as an independent ground of 
judicial review (as stated in an earlier section), this did not have the effect of limiting 
its application. The court accepted that the principle could be of relevance in establishing 
irrationality. Lord Ackner said: “[Counsel] has contended that in issuing these directives 
the Secretary of State has used a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Of course that is a 
picturesque way of describing the Wednesbury irrational test.”98 Similar opinions as to 
the potential overlap of the two tests were expressed in the House of Lords by Lords 
Slynn and Cooke in Regina v. Chief Constable of Sussex, Ex parte International 
Trader’s Ferry Limited99 and Lord Steyn in Daly.100 
 
In fact, are UK courts adopting a margin of appreciation when considering breaches 
of qualified rights under the HRA? The ruling of the House of Lords in Regina (Pro-
Life Alliance) v. BBC101 is possibly evidence that they are doing so. In the pre-HRA 
era the courts repeatedly stated that freedom of expression was a constitutional right. 
One example was Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers102 where a national 
newspaper could not be sued for defamation by a local authority. However, there have 
been recent cases where the courts in domestic law have deferred to the executive in 
allowing infringements of this fundamental right on the grounds of taste and decency 
and the prevention of public disorder. As regards the former issue, public morals, in 
Pro-Life Alliance103 a decision by the BBC and the ITV companies to limit severely 
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the claimants’ transmission of its election broadcast was not unlawful. Although the 
claimants were prepared to permit the screening depicting a suction abortion after 
10.00pm, with a warning about its content prior to transmission, the House of Lords 
showed due deference to the broadcasting authorities in determining that, even with 
this compromise, it was indecent and in bad taste.104 
 
In Regina (Farrakhan) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department105 the claimant, 
the leader of the Nation of Islam, was refused entry into the UK on the basis that he 
would incite racial hatred and be likely to commit other public order offences. 
Although the Court of Appeal found that Article 10(1) was engaged, it accepted the 
decision to exclude the claimant from entering the UK: a proportionate balance had 
been struck by the Secretary of State under Article 10(2) between the public interest 
aim of preventing disorder and the applicant’s freedom of expression. Of particular 
relevance to the Court of Appeal in coming to the conclusion that it did, was the belief 
that a possible margin of appreciation should be shown to the Secretary of State in 
deciding whether his failure to grant the applicant a visa to enter the UK was 
unlawful. The court in fact found a margin of appreciation for several reasons: the 
ECtHR had identified the control of immigration as being an area where the executive 
had particular competence,106 the decision was personally taken by the Minister,107 the 
Minister was far better placed to reach an informed decision as to the likely 
consequences of admitting the applicant to the UK than was the court,108 the Minster 
was democratically accountable for his decision,109 and finally the very limited extent 
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 The Court of Appeal, [2002] EWCA Civ 297, [2002] 3 WLR 1080, ruled that the 
censorship – for the protection of public morals – had constituted a disproportionate 
infringement of Article 10 of the ECHR. For example, Simon Brown LJ (as he then was) said 
(para 57): “Was there a pressing social need to ban this broadcast? I have reached the clear 
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criticism, see, for example, Rowbottom (2003) and Barendt (2003) who describes it as “a bad 
day for free speech” (p.591). 
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to which the right of freedom of expression of the applicant had been restricted.110 
 
It is submitted, therefore, that the courts’ employment of the proportionality test 
means that they are not always reviewing merits: when examining qualified rights of 
the ECHR, judges may have to apply the margin of appreciation principle. That is, 
the public interest will sometimes outweigh the private right of the applicant to such 
a degree that the standard of proportionality does not always involve a court in 
merits-review. Furthermore, the test itself, as identified by Maurice Kay LJ in the 
Court of Appeal in Regina (Clays Lane Housing Co-operative) v. Housing 
Corporation,111 does not require a decision that is the least intrusive of Convention 
rights. To this end, reviewing courts might accord the executive a fair degree of 
latitude in their administrative decision-making, even to the point that they are not 
employing low standards of intervention. How then do these findings about the 
possible high standards of proportionality being applied – either by reference to the 
context in which a particular qualified right of the ECHR arises or the means by 
which the test is employed – affect the legitimacy of the merits-review cases 
identified in the earlier article in this study?  
 
As an interim conclusion these findings are welcomed by the author, and maybe by 
other “political constitutionalists”.112 However, the fact remains, cases were found in 
the previous article in this study where the courts did adopt low standards of 
irrationality. Some of these were cases where the margin of appreciation principle 
did not arise as rights of the applicant, if they were so affected, could not have been 
assessed in terms of justifying infringements on the grounds of the public interest. 
Moreover, what would be the legitimate standard of review if the courts were 
examining breaches of other Articles of the ECHR which do not allow for a 
proportionality type of approach such as the absolute and non-derogable right 
enshrined in Article 3, the prohibition on torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
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 See footnote 12. However, Wadham et al (2007) note that the Court of Appeal’s ruling in 
Farrakhan was a “particularly wide margin of appreciation” (p.198). In this respect perhaps 
Farrakhan should be seen as exceptional, thus the author maybe should have less cause for 
optimism than he shows in the main text. 
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or punishment?113 Would a low standard of intervention be constitutionally 
justifiable in these situations? What would be the legitimate standard of review if a 
court was not necessarily assessing the lawfulness of executive action by reference to 
a particular Article of the ECHR under s.6(1) of the HRA but was considering either 
the “interpretative obligation” under s.3 of the HRA or a declaration of 
incompatibility under s.4(2) of the HRA? For reasons of space these further 
questions about the constitutionality of merits-review in cases where, for example, 
unqualified rights were at issue cannot meaningfully be undertaken here so are 
reserved for the next article in this study. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Traditional public law doctrine dictates that when the executive is acting unlawfully, it 
should have exceeded the expressed and implied limits of the power conferred on it by 
the Legislature. Parliament grants discretionary powers to the executive as a 
constitutional acknowledgement that because of its knowledge and experience it is best 
placed to act. By providing an administrative decision-maker with a degree of latitude to 
decide upon several courses of action within a particular discretion, the high standards of 
intervention inferred from the many definitions of irrationality recognise this 
constitutional norm.114 A reviewing court should therefore interfere under this head of 
challenge only when an administrative decision was not within a range of options 
available to a reasonable decision-maker. This doctrine is, of course, not observed in 
practice on every occasion. Previously the author established that the courts had in fact 
held arguably rational administrative decisions to be unlawful, thus adopting low 
standards of irrationality as a basis for intervention. 
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 See, for example, Ireland v. United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25, para 163. The statement 
that Article 3 does not allow a proportionality type of approach is not strictly true: see 
footnote 84 for an interim discussion of the applicability of proportionality to this article of 
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of such proportions that the guidance could not have been framed by a bona fide exercise of 
political judgment on the part of the Secretary of State.” 
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The purpose here has been to reassess the constitutionality of some of these low 
standards of irrationality which were found in the earlier article of this study. 
Considering the legitimacy of a review of merits based upon the manner of review, it has 
been questioned whether Simon Brown LJ in Ex parte Phoenix Aviation may have been 
justified in adopting a low standard of intervention because he was in fact employing the 
proportionality principle as a substitute for irrationality. The proportionality test has been 
adopted widely by the UK courts in matters of EC Law since the European Communities 
Act 1972 came into force in January 1973. Nevertheless, its case for greater recognition 
in English administrative law has been strengthened since October 2000 with the coming 
into force of the HRA and the incorporation of Convention rights into domestic law. In 
these terms it is difficult to doubt the constitutionality of a review of merits where 
proportionality has been adopted under the auspices of irrationality. Similarly, Laws J in 
Ex parte B may have been acting legitimately as his engagement in a review of merits 
was possibly due to another acceptable basis for judicial intervention, the adoption of the 
“hard look” test. Furthermore, the context of these two cases cannot be ignored. Since 
fundamental rights were at issue on both occasions, again, the constitutionality of these 
reviews of merits is difficult to ignore. The coming into force of the HRA, and especially 
the obligation imposed on the courts by s. 3 to interpret primary and secondary 
legislation in any proceedings in line with Convention rights “so far it is possible to do 
so”, strengthens their case for legitimacy still further. 
 
What then are the consequences of this constitutional repositioning of the courts? Of 
course, public law espouses the principle of the separation of powers between the 
organs of the state. Those individuals who contend, for whatever reason, that a review 
of merits is legitimate surely do not desire a complete merger of the judicial and 
executive functions: there must still be a threshold where a reviewing court is not 
permitted to overstep? 
 
In the subsequent article in this study the author will identify such a limit to judicial 
review, “substitution of judgment”. He will, however, encounter problems in the 
practical application of this limit, some commentators, for example, having confused 
it with other principles like proportionality. Since this article has found 
proportionality review to be in fact constitutionally justifiable, there is, therefore, a 
worrying conclusion to be drawn from this confusion: the possible inability to classify 
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any low standards of intervention as being illegitimate (at least) by reference to the 
manner of review adopted.  
 
Finding the manner of review to be therefore inappropriate as a means of identifying 
unacceptable grounds for judicial intervention, the author prefers in this later article to 
classify low standards of irrationality by reference to context. However, this, too, will 
pose similar problems in that constitutional justifications for intervention such as 
breaches of basic rights invariably overlap with unconstitutional ones such as matters 
of policy. In the long term, therefore, the third article in this study will highlight a 
fundamental inability to identify a zone of judicial intervention where the courts are 
excluded.  If traditionalists within public law are concerned about the wider 
acceptance of merits-review by the courts, as identified by the author in the previous 
article, the lack of any acceptable limits to judicial review signals a serious 
constitutional shift in the balance of power between the executive and the unelected 
courts. Are we therefore witnessing a fusing of the judicial and executive roles? If so, 
for reasons of democracy, the ultimate conclusion of this three article study will be the 
demand for the courts to return to more orthodox standards of judicial intervention.  
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